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ABSTRACT—Professor H.L.A. Hart’s theory of the rule of recognition,
introduced in 1961, asserts that every legal system requires a rule of
recognition to tell society what the law is. Though much scholarship has been
dedicated to analyzing America’s theoretical rule of recognition, Hart’s
theory has not yet been applied to the numerous actions and operations of
America’s Executive Branch. The rule of recognition should be able to tell
us which executive actions have the authority of law. Yet, when we try to
make sense of various recent orders, memos, guidance documents, and
letters emanating from the White House and administrative agencies, the rule
of recognition falls short of its purpose.
This Note is the first to apply Hart’s theory to a sample of Executive
Branch actions—including executive orders, “Dear Colleague” letters, and
even Twitter—and derive lessons about Hart’s work from that application.
By taking the rule of recognition out of the realm of theory and applying it
to our modern reality, this Note raises important questions about our
government and Hart’s theory. Is there something wrong with Executive
Branch actions? Is there something wrong with Hart’s theory? Maybe it is
failing to settle uncertainty as it was proffered to do. Or maybe this realworld application gives us reason to question Hart’s fundamental thesis.
Addressing these questions will not only deepen our understanding of the
law’s philosophical underpinnings but will also bolster our understanding of
various government actions in the real world.
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INTRODUCTION
After consultation with my Generals and military experts, please be advised that
the United States Government will not accept or allow . . . Transgender
individuals to serve in any capacity in the U.S. Military. Our military must be
focused on decisive and overwhelming . . . victory and cannot be burdened with
the tremendous medical costs and disruption that transgender in the military
would entail. Thank you.1

America awoke to these tweets from President Trump on July 26, 2017.
Trump hit “Tweet” at 6:55 AM, and by 7:00 AM, Washington was
scrambling to figure out if the President had just enacted a new policy
through Twitter. In an article aptly entitled How to Spark Panic and
Confusion in Three Tweets: Do Impulsive Twitter Messages from the
President Count as Formal Policy Action?, journalist Matt Thompson wrote,
“In the instant, no one knew whether the tweets themselves had the weight
of policy.” 2 The issue was not settled until the next day, when the Joint
Chiefs of Staff issued a statement: “There will be no modifications to the
current policy until the President’s direction has been received by the
Secretary of Defense and the Secretary has issued implementation
guidance.”3 Only then did people realize the federal government would not

1 Matt Thompson, How to Spark Panic and Confusion in Three Tweets: Do Impulsive Twitter
Messages from the President Count as Formal Policy Action?, ATLANTIC (Jan. 13,
2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/01/donald-trump-tweets-transgender-militaryservice-ban/579655/ [https://perma.cc/4WU2-CPMW].
2 Id.
3 Phil Stewart & Idrees Ali, ‘We Will Continue to Treat All of Our Personnel with Respect’:
General Says No Moves on Trans Ban Yet, INSIDER (July 27, 2017, 10:09 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/we-will-continue-to-treat-all-of-our-personnel-with-respect-generalsays-no-moves-on-trans-ban-yet-2017-7 [https://perma.cc/DN8Z-2XD5].
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treat these tweets as an order. But a whirlwind of uncertainty had already
shaken our legal and political systems.4
This episode brought to the foreground a question lurking in the
background of our legal system: how can we tell when a government action
has the authority of law? Political theorists increasingly ask this question
given the rise in executive action in the twenty-first century.5 The President
and administrative agencies frequently promulgate new policies and rules,6
including signing statements, executive orders, legal memoranda, Office of
Legal Counsel guidance, administrative agency advisory documents, “Dear
Colleague” letters, proclamations, administrative orders, presidential
directives, letters on tariffs and international trade, and executive
agreements. Which of these, if any, have legal effect?
H.L.A. Hart’s “rule of recognition” might provide an answer. Hart, who
has been described as the “premier legal philosopher” 7 of the twentieth
century for his contributions to legal theory generally and legal positivism
specifically,8 offered an answer as early as 1961 by giving us the rule of
recognition.9 Any developed legal system, Hart reasoned, will have a rule
that allows that system to say what the law is.10 So how does one know when
4 Thomas Gibbons-Neff, Pentagon Has Made No Change Yet to Its Transgender Policy, Says
Highest-Ranking Officer in U.S. Military, WASH. POST (July 27, 2017, 9:00 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2017/07/27/pentagon-has-made-no-change-yetto-its-transgender-policy-says-highest-ranking-officer-in-u-s-military/ [https://perma.cc/9TJY-HZKW]
(“The lack of clear direction from officials left the status of thousands of active transgender service
members in limbo, one day after President Trump’s sudden announcement on Twitter.”).
5 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Presidential Administration and the Traditions of Administrative
Law, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1953, 1968 (2015) (“By the end of the twentieth century and accelerating at
the beginning of the twenty-first, the President and the vastly expanded executive branch have become
the most powerful engine of government.”); Melina T. Oliverio, Comment, The Role of the Executive in
Rulemaking: An Exploration of Executive Action in United States Immigration Law, 70 ADMIN. L. REV.
715, 716 (2018) (asserting that the “use of executive action has become increasingly common”).
6 See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Administrative States: Beyond Presidential Administration, 98 TEX. L.
REV. 265, 270 (2019) (“[M]ost significant policymaking comes from agency action rather than
legislation.”); Michael A. Livermore & Daniel Richardson, Administrative Law in an Era of Partisan
Volatility, 69 EMORY L.J. 1, 35 (2019) (asserting that “[t]he current party system” has become so
polarized that “[e]xecutive actions replace legislation as the means of moving a policy program forward”).
7 George A. Martinez, Foreword: A Symposium on the Jurisprudence of H.L.A. Hart, 52 SMU L.
REV. 25, 25 (1999); see also Brian Leiter, The End of Empire: Dworkin and Jurisprudence in the 21st
Century, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 165, 168 (2004) (describing Hart as one of two “dominant figures in twentiethcentury legal philosophy,” with the other being Hans Kelsen).
8 “Legal positivism, in contrast with (traditional) natural law theory, is about the possibility and the
value of a descriptive, morally neutral theory of law.” Brian Bix, Positively Positivism, 85 VA. L. REV.
889, 904 (1999). Under legal positivism’s “separation thesis,” morality and law always remain separate—
i.e., law is not necessarily contingent on morality. See Jules L. Coleman, The Architecture of
Jurisprudence, 121 YALE L.J. 2, 5–6 (2011).
9 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 92–94 & passim (2d ed. 1994).
10 Id. at 97.
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a government has made a new law? In one legal system, the rule of
recognition might be that whenever the elected legislature passes a bill by a
majority vote, that bill shall be a law. In another legal system, the rule of
recognition might be that whenever the king speaks from the throne, his
words shall be law. In short, the rule of recognition allows a society to
identify certain government pronouncements as “law” and give them binding
authority. Without the rule of recognition, the people governed by a legal
system might be uncertain about whether, for example, a report counts as
law if an elected committee issued it but did not vote on it—or whether the
king’s tweets have the force of law.
This Note is the first to apply Hart’s theory to the actions of the modern
Executive Branch. Though scholars have already done much work to
understand the rule of recognition,11 more is needed to understand Hart’s
work as applied to today’s reality. This Note takes up that task, examining
the extent to which Hart’s theory maps onto the real world by analyzing
policy actions within the U.S. Executive Branch. These examples uncover
uncertainties and weaknesses in Hart’s theory of the rule of recognition that
lie dormant unless one attempts to put it into practice.12
What does applying this theory to reality demonstrate about Hart’s
theory? This main question can be divided into three smaller inquiries: First,
is the rule of recognition theory fundamentally flawed in the sense that it can

11 See Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L. REV. 621, 621–
22 (1987) (offering “a fairly comprehensive account of how one might try to state a rule of recognition
for someplace in this country”); Norman P. Ho, Internationalizing and Historicizing Hart’s Theory of
Law, 10 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 183, 185 (2017) (applying Hart’s theory “to non-Western as well as
premodern legal cultures”); Stephen V. Carey, Comment, What Is the Rule of Recognition in the United
States?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1161, 1163 (2009) (bringing Hart’s theory out “of a purely theoretical
debate” and applying it to the overall U.S. legal system); Douglas E. Edlin, The Rule of Recognition and
the Rule of Law: Departmentalism and Constitutional Development in the United States and the United
Kingdom, 64 AM. J. COMP. L. 371, 373–74 (2016); Matthew D. Adler, Constitutional Fidelity, the Rule
of Recognition, and the Communitarian Turn in Contemporary Positivism, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1671,
1675 (2006); David Gray Carlson, Legal Positivism and Russell’s Paradox, 5 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 257,
259 (2013); Anthony J. Sebok, Is the Rule of Recognition a Rule?, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1539, 1552–
55 (1997); Jules L. Coleman, Rules and Social Facts, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 703, 703 (1991).
12 My goal is to add to the discourse started by Professor Kent Greenawalt when he said it “was not
until I had struggled with these matters for some time that I realized more was involved than applying
Hart’s basic theory to an extremely complicated legal reality.” When we explore this complicated reality,
Professor Greenawalt argues, we discover that “[a]spects of that reality proved recalcitrant in the face of
Hart’s categories; the conceptual possibilities and relationships among standards proved richer than one
would gather from The Concept of Law.” Greenawalt, supra note 11, at 622.
Furthermore, this Note aims to answer two questions posed by Professor F. Patrick Hubbard: First,
does Hart’s rule of recognition “provide a framework for increasing our understanding of American
constitutional law?” Second, “does the consideration of the first question provide insights into the utility
of Hart’s ‘rule of recognition’?” F. Patrick Hubbard, Power to the People: The Takings Clause, Hart’s
Rule of Recognition, and Populist Law-Making, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 87, 88 (2011).
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no longer identify what is law? The examples of executive action in this Note
reveal that the theory is not so flawed as to render it useless, but it needs
revision. Second, does the rule of recognition fail to resolve the uncertainty
about which government actions have the force of law? If the rule of
recognition fails to resolve uncertainty in the Executive Branch, then
government officials will likely resort to normative and moral reasoning to
determine whether they should follow it. Using moral reasoning to decide
what is a valid law, however, is antithetical to legal positivism, for legal
positivists like Hart separate questions of law from questions of morality.13
So the third question is, if government officials use moral reasoning to
ascertain whether an executive action is law, then what do these observations
tell us about legal positivism?
Part I reviews Hart’s theory of the rule of recognition, and then posits a
hypothetical legal system meant to show how Hart’s theory may not have
adequately anticipated the complexities of modern American government.
Part II applies Hart’s theory to reality through illustrative examples of
executive actions that create uncertainty about which actions bear legal
authority. These observations bolster the assertion that our modern legal
system is far more complex than Hart envisioned. Part III examines what this
means for our Executive Branch, ultimately concluding that the uncertainty
surrounding many executive actions is dangerous to our constitutional
democracy. Part IV explores what these examples from the Executive
Branch reveal about Hart’s theory, the rule of recognition, and the central
claim of legal positivism. At bottom, Hart’s theory appreciates at a
rudimentary level, but does not fully explain, legal systems as complex as
the United States’. Moreover, the uncertainty accompanying Executive
Branch action challenges democratic decision-making and the rule of law.
I.

THE RULE OF RECOGNITION

This Part lays the foundation for applying the rule of recognition to our
modern legal system by first explaining Hart’s theory and then expanding
13 This is known as the “separation thesis.” See Edward A. Purcell Jr., Democracy, the Constitution,
and Legal Positivism in America: Lessons from a Winding and Troubled History, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1457,
1460 (2014) (stating that the separation thesis “means that the two realms of ‘law’ and ‘morals’ are
different, and that confusion is avoided and ‘law’ more precisely identified when analysts treat ‘law’ as
distinct from ‘morals’”); H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM: STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE AND
POLITICAL THEORY 28 (1982) (showing that Jeremy Bentham insisted “on a precise and so far as possible
a morally neutral vocabulary for use in the discussion of law and politics”). Explained differently, legal
positivists separate what the law is from what the law should be. See HART, supra note 9, at 185–86
(“Here we shall take Legal Positivism to mean the simple contention that it is in no sense a necessary
truth that laws reproduce or satisfy certain demands of morality, though in fact they have often done so.”).
Whereas natural law proponents argue that an immoral law is not law at all, legal positivists like Hart
would assert that it certainly is law and the debate about its morality is a separate discussion.
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into areas Hart left unaddressed. The purpose is to establish what Hart did
and did not anticipate in presenting his theory of the rule of recognition.
A. Hart’s Theory and the Problem of Uncertainty
In his most famous and influential book, The Concept of Law, H.L.A.
Hart established his theory of law as a union of primary and secondary
rules.14 Primary rules govern conduct and behavior, and typically consist of
lists of “thou shalt,” “thou shalt not,” and similar rules.15 Secondary rules, by
contrast, govern primary rules by establishing systems for creating new
primary rules and adjudicating existing ones.16
To understand this important innovation in the explanation of legal
systems, Hart asks us to imagine a primitive society that only relies on
primary rules to guide people’s conduct.17 According to Hart, these rules,
such as “no killing other people,” or “no stealing crops,” are insufficient to
structure society’s conduct, for primary rules without secondary rules
produce three inevitable deficiencies—inefficiency, static character, and
uncertainty.18
Inefficiency manifests when it is impossible to determine if one of the
primary rules has been violated, rendering the legal system unworkable. If
one member of the community accuses another of stealing, then how does
the group resolve this dispute? The society must adopt a rule of adjudication,
which will establish the methods for resolving disputes over the primary
rules. 19 This could take the form of a magistrate administering judicial
rulings or even trial by combat for more daring communities.
The problem of static character is when society is unable to adapt the
primary rules as new situations arise. Say, for example, someone in the
village is attacked and she kills her assailant in self-defense. The community
must consider whether to alter the primary rule of “no killing” to add a selfdefense exception. To do so, a rule of change must be adopted so that the
community has mechanisms for amending its primary rules. 20 This might
take the form of a council or a direct vote by the villagers.
Lastly, the deficiency of uncertainty comes about when society cannot
tell whether certain government actions have the effect of law. This
14

HART, supra note 9, at 94.
Id. at 94.
16 Id.
17 HART, supra note 9, at 91 (“It is, of course, possible to imagine a society without a legislature,
courts, or officials of any kind.”).
18 HART, supra note 9, at 92–94.
19 Id. at 96–97.
20 Id. at 95–96.
15
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deficiency undermines the entire system, because even with rulemaking and
adjudicatory bodies, it remains unclear how the community will know when
those bodies have wielded their authority to decide or change the law. Do the
magistrate’s opinions during a dinner discussion have binding effect? Can
the council amend a law if only one-third of its members voted for the
change? Thus, the rule of recognition is a necessary concomitant to the rule
of change and rule of adjudication—if we do not know what the law is, it
matters not whether we have processes by which we can modify it or
adjudicate disputes.
To solve this problem, which is arguably the gravest problem facing the
community 21 (besides rival tribes, famine, and pestilence, of course), the
people must adopt a rule of recognition establishing the rules for when a law
will be recognized as authoritative. 22 The rule serves as an uncertaintysettling device. For example, the village’s rule of recognition might present
the rule “whenever a majority of the council votes in the affirmative for a
new law or a change in existing law, that law shall be enacted and binding.”
Hart viewed the rule of recognition as the most important secondary rule for
any legal system: “[W]here a secondary rule of recognition is accepted and
used for the identification of primary rules of obligation . . . this situation . . .
deserves, if anything does, to be called the foundations of a legal system.”23
Functionally, the rule of recognition serves a dual role in Hart’s theory.
First, it resolves the uncertainty described above. Second, and more
important, the rule of recognition is central to the system of law because it
declares what the law is. Without the rule of recognition, there is no
commonly-agreed-upon law,24 so disputes will persist over what the law is,
even after the rules of adjudication and change have been implemented.25
Furthermore, the rule of recognition is essential to Hart’s theory of legal
positivism.26 Positivists argue that because law is not based on morality or
normative custom, every legal system needs an amoral method of identifying

See id. at 92 (explaining that “if doubts arise as to what the rules are or as to the precise scope of
some given rule, there will be no procedure for settling this doubt, either by reference to an authoritative
text or to an official whose declarations on this point are authoritative”).
22 Id. at 94.
23 Id. at 100.
24 See Scott J. Shapiro, What Is the Rule of Recognition (and Does It Exist)? 8 (Yale L. Sch. Pub. L.
& Legal Theory Rsch. Paper Series, Rsch. Paper No. 181, 2009), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1304645 [https://perma.cc/Q388-LXHA].
25 See HART, supra note 9, at 92.
26 See supra note 8.
21
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the law as law. Key to the legal positivist view, the rule of recognition is
foundational because it establishes the validity of all other rules.27
B. The Rule of Recognition in the Modern Context
As Hart describes it, the rule of recognition appears powerfully simple.
All a society needs to do to empower its people to discern valid laws is
establish rules for how it will determine what a law is. This apparent
simplicity, however, falls away in modern contexts. Returning to our small
village, imagine the village continues to grow, and the Council of Elders
finds itself buried beneath an avalanche of complaints and requests, most of
them regarding agriculture. The Elders then pass a statute that says, “We
hereby create an Agriculture Committee which shall be composed of ten
citizens from the village selected annually by the Council of Elders and shall
be charged with ensuring that the village’s farming conditions remain
healthy and bountiful.” Interpreting this charge, the Agriculture Committee
takes it upon itself to ban certain nutrient-sapping plants, penalizing anyone
found violating this rule. Rather than override this action with a clarifying
statute, the Elders acquiesce (perhaps out of inertia or perhaps out of the
inability to act due to village politics), allowing the Committee to continue
issuing various regulations and penalties.
Essentially, a body external to the Council of Elders has issued a
primary rule that directly impacts the villagers’ behavior. What does the rule
of recognition tell us about these actions? Perhaps the village recognizes
these actions as “law,” or it categorizes them as something different, maybe
as regulations, but still functionally equivalent to law because they are
binding on the villagers. It is unclear whether the villagers are free to
disregard the Committee if their society’s established rule of recognition
does not recognize committee pronouncements as law.
These questions did not escape Hart, for he expected the legal system
to grow in complexity proportionally to society. He states that legally
authoritative materials need not be rigidly limited to laws passed by a
legislature or a king. That is because in any complex legal system there will
be a variety of sources of law, so “the rule of recognition is correspondingly
more complex.”28 Hart seems to have anticipated something similar to the
Elders forming an Agriculture Committee, for he explains that the validity
of the Committee’s rules can be traced back to the validity of the Council of
27 HART, supra note 9, at 111–12; see also id. at 103 (“To say that a given rule is valid is to recognize
it as passing all the tests provided by the rule of recognition . . . .”); Shapiro, supra note 24, at 10
(explaining that “the rule of recognition secures the existence of all primary rules,” because “[a]s long as
a rule bears the characteristics of legality set out in the rule of recognition, it exists and is legally valid”).
28 HART, supra note 9, at 101.
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Elders. So, if the Agriculture Committee passes a new “law,” is that “law”
valid? Hart answers, “Yes: because it was made in exercise of the powers
conferred, and in accordance with the procedure specified, by a statutory
order made by” a government official, “this first stage [of] statutory order
provides the criteria in terms of which the validity of the by-law is
assessed.”29
In the hypothetical village, Hart would direct us to refer to the Council’s
edict that created and empowered the Agriculture Committee.30 Assuming
the statute delegated sufficient power to the Committee, the Committee’s
“law” satisfies the rule of recognition. If, on the other hand, the statute only
gave the Agriculture Committee the power to conduct studies and report
back to the Elders, the Committee’s attempts to directly regulate growing
and harvesting would be invalid. They would not be authorized by any law
which itself was valid under the rule of recognition.
Most importantly, Hart explained that for “the most part the rule of
recognition is not stated, but its existence is shown in the way in which
particular rules are identified, either by courts or other officials or private
persons or their advisers.” 31 If, after the Committee issues its harvesting
regulations, officials or private persons begin following them, Hart would
likely say these regulations pass muster under the rule of recognition, for
they have been shown to be valid.32 Put simply, the rule of recognition’s
“existence is secured simply because of its acceptance and practice.” 33
Therefore, there are two minimum conditions for a legal system: First, the
people obey primary rules, which have been deemed valid by the rule of
recognition. Second, the people accept the rule of recognition.34 In assessing
whether the Agriculture Committee’s actions are law, Hart would suggest
that the people following the rules show them to be valid.
To test this, let’s imagine that the village continues to grow and
develop, and the villagers decide to elect a mayor. The Elders decide the
Id. at 107. Hart discusses the validity of such bylaws when he explains the role of the “Oxfordshire
County Council.” Id. at 106–07.
30 See id. at 107.
31 HART, supra note 9, at 101.
32 See Stephen Perry, Hart on Social Rules and the Foundations of Law: Liberating the Internal
Point of View, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1171, 1171 (2006) (stating that “[t]o use the rule is to conform one’s
own conduct to the relevant pattern, and to accept the rule is to adopt the attitude that the pattern is a
required standard both for oneself and for everyone else in the group”).
33 Shapiro, supra note 24, at 5 (elaborating that the “rule of recognition validates, but is not
itself validated”).
34 HART, supra note 9, at 116–17; see also Matthew D. Adler, Interpretive Contestation and Legal
Correctness, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1115, 1128 (2012) (describing the rule of recognition as “an
ultimate criterion of legal validity that is accepted as such by contemporary officials within the system;
other laws are valid by derivation from the rule of recognition” (emphasis added)).
29
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mayor should oversee the Agriculture Committee, as well as other newly
created committees, such as the Butcher Committee, Baker Committee, and
Candlestick-Maker Committee. The mayor soon begins issuing orders about
how the committees will execute the statutes. The committees and officials
comply with these orders and even begin circulating internal letters detailing
how to implement the policies. Last, imagine that a group of curmudgeons,
who are sticklers for formalism in government, take to the town square to
speak against the validity of the mayor’s actions. They even challenge the
validity of the committees’ authority to generate their own primary rules.
This is America in 2022. As seen from the village, the rule of
recognition exists to resolve uncertainty and is central to any legal system.35
But given the myriad “laws” emanating from the modern Executive Branch,
we now have pressing questions of uncertainty that need to be resolved for
the rule of recognition to function properly in the United States. Moving
away from our hypothetical village and examining how the rule of
recognition functions in the present-day United States, the next Part surveys
potential sources of “law” in the Executive Branch and uncovers various
examples of uncertainty. This yields insights into both the current state of
our Executive Branch and Hart’s theory of the rule of recognition.
II. THE U.S. RULE OF RECOGNITION
APPLIED TO THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
This Part argues that we do not have a settled rule of recognition for
many Executive Branch actions. America’s legal system is complex, to say
the least. 36 Many actions deriving from Article II of the Constitution—
including actions taken by the President, executive officers, and
administrative agencies—do not fit neatly into any rule of recognition. For
example, Congress has not declared war for decades. Yet the Pentagon and
even Congress have accepted that we are engaged in a “war on terror” that
has been ongoing since 2001.37 Further complicating the rule of recognition
is the fact that “law” in the U.S. legal system cannot be defined solely by

35 See Shapiro, supra note 24, at 8 (“[O]ne role that the rule of recognition plays in all legal systems
[is] the resolution of normative uncertainty. According to Hart, the rule of recognition resolves doubts
and disagreements within a group about which primary rules to follow. It does this by picking out
properties of primary rules the possession of which mark them as binding.”).
36 See Greenawalt, supra note 11, at 622 (explaining that analyzing the U.S. rule of recognition
“certainly dispels any illusion that the rule of recognition for the United States can be reduced to any
simple statement, such as ‘The federal Constitution is our rule of recognition’”).
37 See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on
Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2070 (2005).

586

117:577 (2022)

The Rule of Recognition and Presidential Power

reference to the Constitution.38 Consistent with Hart’s theory, limiting the
U.S. rule of recognition to the Constitution precludes the rule from being
shown through observing official behavior.39 The following Section explores
actions taken by the President and administrative agencies, attempting to
make sense of their validity as law. These phenomena highlight uncertainties
about what constitutes law in our modern system of government.
A. The President
In the U.S. legal system, the executive wields a vast toolkit of
presidential prerogatives, such as signing statements, executive orders,
vetoes, pardons, wartime orders, Office of Legal Counsel memoranda,
administrative agency advisory documents, and “Dear Colleague” letters.
Some of these actions trace their roots to enumerated constitutional
provisions. For example, vetoes, pardons, and the Commander-in-Chief
power are all explicitly permitted by the Constitution’s text,40 so the rule of
recognition is easily applied to these acts. Though the use of these powers
has sometimes been controversial, they rarely produce the uncertainty that
can result from executive actions not explicitly authorized by the
Constitution. On the other hand, many executive actions fall outside the
President’s enumerated powers. While each claims a tenuous connection to
authority deriving from the Constitution or a statute, this Note contends that
our rule of recognition does not know what to make of them.
1. Executive Orders
Let’s start with one of the most widely used executive actions:
presidential orders. The written instruments at a President’s disposal include
38 Professor Matthew Adler has asked whether the rule of recognition in the United States is the
Constitution. He states that the “text of the 1787 Constitution (including the amending clause), and
whatever is validated as law by that text (including both amendments to the original text and subordinate
law, e.g., statutes enacted pursuant to Article I or judicial directives issued pursuant to Article III), is
law.” He notes that while such a “statement would need much refinement because it does not allow for
nontextual sources of constitutional law, or address interpretive standards,” it still “helps clarify what
Hart meant by the rule of recognition, and what that might be in the U.S. context.” Matthew D. Adler,
Popular Constitutionalism and the Rule of Recognition: Whose Practices Ground U.S. Law?, 100 NW.
U. L. REV. 719, 731 (2006). Likewise, Professor Alice Ristroph argues there is reason to be skeptical of
a single rule of recognition given the frequent interpretative disputes over constitutional rules. Alice
Ristroph, Is Law? Constitutional Crisis and Existential Anxiety, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 431, 451 (2009).
39 See Edlin, supra note 11, at 373–74 (reasoning that a legal system’s rule of recognition “will often
encompass the nation’s constitution,” but “it cannot be equated with the constitution”); Hubbard, supra
note 12, at 113 (arguing that the United States’ rule of recognition must be something broader than the
Constitution because the Constitution must be supplemented by the vast array of “rules” that have gained
validity not explicitly through the Constitution but because “they have been accepted by officials and, at
a minimum, acquiesced to by citizens”).
40 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2–3 (vetoes); id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (pardons and Commander-in-Chief
power).
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presidential memoranda, proclamations, homeland-security presidential
directives, letters on tariffs and international trade, administrative orders,
executive agreements with foreign nations, signing statements, and
executive orders.41 At first blush, executive orders and proclamations seem
more official than the others in that both must be published in Title 3 of the
Code of Federal Regulations,42 but the other written instruments are followed
even if not published. I will not focus on the differences between them, for
the distinction is more in form than in substance,43 and the courts treat all
relatively the same. 44 Moreover, it is widely accepted that it makes no
difference whether the President is acting under implied or express authority,
for both will be given the same effect.45
Every president throughout history has used executive orders in one
form or another.46 In recent times, such orders have grown more frequent.
George Washington issued eight executive orders, which seems quaint
compared to the presidents of the past half-century—Donald Trump: 220,
Barack Obama: 276, George W. Bush: 291, Bill Clinton: 364, George H.W.
Bush: 166, Ronald Reagan: 381, Jimmy Carter: 320.47 Franklin Roosevelt
holds the record at 3,721. 48 President Biden also set a record by signing

41

See VIVIAN S. CHU & TODD GARVEY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS20846, EXECUTIVE ORDERS:
ISSUANCE, MODIFICATION, AND REVOCATION 1 & n.2 (2014), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/RS20846.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9EJ3-M4SM]; John C. Duncan Jr., A Critical Consideration of Executive Orders:
Glimmerings of Autopoiesis in the Executive Role, 35 VT. L. REV. 333, 352–62 (2010).
42 44 U.S.C. § 1505(a).
43 CHU & GARVEY, supra note 41, at 2 (explaining that the “distinction between these instruments—
executive orders, presidential memoranda, and proclamations—seems to be more a matter of form than
of substance, given that all three may be employed to direct and govern the actions of government officials
and agencies” (citing STAFF OF H. COMM. ON GOV’T OPERATIONS, 85TH CONG., EXECUTIVE ORDERS
AND PROCLAMATIONS: A STUDY OF A USE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 1 (Comm. Print 1957)).
44 Id. at 2 (“[I]f issued under a legitimate claim of authority and made public, a presidential directive
could have the force and effect of law, ‘of which all courts are bound to take notice, and to which all
courts are bound to give effect.’” (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 80 U.S. 154, 156 (1871))).
45 See, e.g., Duncan, supra note 41, at 338 (“[E]xecutive orders issued based on implied authority
have the same effect as those issued pursuant to express authority.”).
46 See CHU & GARVEY, supra note 41, at 2 (“Despite the amorphous nature of the authority to issue
executive orders, presidential memoranda, and proclamations, these instruments have been employed by
every President since the inception of the Republic.”); see also Lisa Manheim & Kathryn A. Watts,
Reviewing Presidential Orders, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 1743, 1763–69 (2019) (detailing how “presidents have
relied on executive orders and other written directives throughout our nation’s history”); Duncan, supra
note 41, at 339–45 (showing how executive orders have been used since Washington’s presidency).
47 Executive Orders, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (June 16, 2022), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
data/orders.php [https://perma.cc/F24Q-AYTR]; Executive Orders, FED. REG., https://www.federal
register.gov/presidential-documents/executive-orders [https://perma.cc/2BBG-32BJ].
48 Id. For a discussion of Roosevelt’s use of executive orders, see generally Tara L. Branum,
President or King? The Use and Abuse of Executive Orders in Modern-Day America, 28 J. LEGIS. 1, 28–
29 (2002).
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twenty-eight executive orders in his first two weeks in office,49 and he signed
roughly fifty more in his first year in office.50 So it is not that executive orders
lack a strong basis in history; the uncertainty they create comes from whether
they have a constitutional source.51
There exists no formal definition of executive orders, contributing to
the uncertainty they create. 52 Courts and scholars have identified three
potential sources of authority for executive orders: the Constitution, statutory
authorization, and the inherent powers of the President, with the last being
the most controversial.53 The Congressional Research Service explains that
“the President’s ability to use executive orders as a means of implementing
presidential power has been established as a matter of law and practice.”54
But this is not the end of the story, for an executive order must derive
authority from “power vested in the President by the U.S. Constitution or
delegated to the President by Congress.”55
Congressional acquiescence has also been proffered as a post hoc
source of authority, and judicial deference has further legitimized the
practice.56 Only twice has the Supreme Court overturned an executive order:
in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer57 and in Chamber of Commerce
v. Reich. 58 Furthermore, the Supreme Court blessed executive orders in

49 Tamara Keith, With 28 Executive Orders Signed, President Biden Is Off to a Record Start, NPR
(Feb. 3, 2021, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2021/02/03/963380189/with-28-executive-orders-signedpresident-biden-is-off-to-a-record-start [https://perma.cc/3PPQ-BABM].
50 See Executive Orders, FED. REG., https://www.federalregister.gov/presidential-documents/
executive-orders [https://perma.cc/3SCA-DM72].
51 See CHU & GARVEY, supra note 41, i (“The U.S. Constitution does not define these presidential
instruments and does not explicitly vest the President with the authority to issue them. Nonetheless, such
orders are accepted as an inherent aspect of presidential power. Moreover, if they are based on appropriate
authority, they have the force and effect of law.”).
52 See WILLIAM F. FUNK & RICHARD H. SEAMON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 65 (3d ed. 2009); Duncan,
supra note 41, at 337 (“The troubling aspect of executive orders is that they bypass traditional
administrative law processes, which otherwise would provide for openness, discussion, and judicial
review. In fact, executive orders commonly bypass avenues of review.”).
53 For a detailed consideration of these three sources, see Duncan, supra note 41, at 366–74. See
also CHU & GARVEY, supra note 41, at 1–3.
54 CHU & GARVEY, supra note 41, at 1.
55 Id.
56 Duncan, supra note 41, at 374–76.
57 343 U.S. 579, 583, 589 (1952) (striking down Executive Order 10,340, through which President
Truman attempted to seize and operate the nation’s steel mills). For the text of the executive order, see
Exec. Order No. 10,340, 17 Fed. Reg. 3,139 (Apr. 10, 1952).
58 74 F.3d 1322, 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (striking down Executive Order 12,954, which authorized the
Secretary of Labor to disqualify employers who hired permanent replacement workers during lawful
strikes from certain federal contracts). For the text of the executive order, see Exec. Order. No. 12,954,
60 Fed. Reg. 13,023 (Mar. 10, 1995).
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Jenkins v. Collard, when it held that a president’s proclamation “has the
force of public law” and that courts must recognize it as such.59
Executive orders have been described as “instant law” and “steeped
in controversy.” 60 Consequently, there is uncertainty surrounding the
legitimacy of executive orders that lack explicit statutory or constitutionally
derived authorization. When this happens, executive orders arguably fall
outside the realm of our rule of recognition and land in what Justice Jackson
termed a “zone of twilight.”61 And controversy is particularly likely when the
White House engages in legislative, rather than executive, activities.62 These
blurred actions obscure the separation of powers prescribed in the structure
of our Constitution. As noted above, the uncertainty surrounding executive
orders could simply be inherent in the fact that the Constitution provides no
express language governing their existence or scope.63
This uncertainty is compounded by the dearth of legal doctrine
clarifying the scope and effect of executive orders. 64 Furthermore, the
Supreme Court has held that the word “agency” in the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) does not refer to the President, so the APA does not
apply to executive orders.65 Despite little doctrine to guide judges, litigation
challenging executive orders has still reached the courts. In his first year in
office, President Trump faced nearly a dozen court battles over his executive
actions.66 Currently, some speculate that the Supreme Court will wade into
the debate over nationwide injunctions, 67 which are often used to halt

59

145 U.S. 546, 560–61 (1892) (citing Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212, 215 (1890)).
What Is an Executive Order?, AM. BAR ASS’N (Jan. 25, 2021), https://www.americanbar.org/
groups/public_education/publications/teaching-legal-docs/what-is-an-executive-order- [https://perma.
cc/8AY3-7C68].
61 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637.
62 See Duncan, supra note 41, at 411.
63 See Todd F. Gaziano, The Use and Abuse of Executive Orders and Other Presidential Directives,
5 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 267, 269–70 (2001); CHU & GARVEY, supra note 41, at 2.
64 See Manheim & Watts, supra note 46, at 1747 (arguing that current judicial precedents do not
“provide anything close to a well-developed or coherent legal framework for courts to follow when
reviewing presidential orders”). The Ninth Circuit has stated, “In contrast to the many established
principles for interpreting legislation, there appear to be few such principles to apply in interpreting
executive orders.” City and Cnty. of S.F. v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1238 (9th Cir. 2018).
65 Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800–01 (1992) (reasoning that the actions of the
President are not challengeable under the APA because the statute limits review to “final agency action”
and the President is not an agency).
66 See Manheim & Watts, supra note 46, at 1783, 1784 tbl.1.
67 Frank J. Thompson, Will the Supreme Court Weaken Lower-Court Checks on Biden’s
Executive Power?, BROOKINGS (Feb. 1, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2021/02/01/willthe-supreme-court-weaken-lower-court-checks-on-bidens-executive-power/ [https://perma.cc/WZR5GY9H].
60
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executive actions. Despite a shortage of legal doctrine, litigation challenging
executive action shows no signs of stopping.
The rule of recognition theory seems to require us to categorize
executive orders as either “law” or “not law,” which is difficult. But there is
an alternative view that reconciles executive orders with the theory: viewing
orders as rules clarifying preexisting law for executive officers, rather than
laws themselves. Under this view, when issuing an executive order, the
President is not declaring a new law, but is merely specifying the
enforcement or implementation of an existing one which has already been
legitimized by the rule of recognition after going through bicameralism and
presentment (if it is a statute from Congress) or notice and comment (if it is
a rule from an administrative agency). One might be tricked into this view,
thinking executive orders are only orders to the Executive Branch, as their
name implies. But executive orders in fact can be binding orders on the
American people.68 For example, after FDR issued a proclamation in 1934
making it illegal for private actors to sell arms to Bolivia or Paraguay,69 the
government indicted a U.S. company for violating this proclamation.70 Or
consider how in 1971, President Nixon imposed a $5,000 fine for
noncompliance with a proclamation that froze prices and wages for private
businesses.71 In Hart’s words, executive orders can be primary rules.
How might we resolve uncertainty about the validity of executive
orders? In Hart’s theory, government officials’ compliance with potential
sources of law legitimizes those sources under the rule of recognition. In
effect, artificial certainty ossifies around these actions through the
government and the people’s acquiescence. Legislative acquiescence is a
post hoc justification for executive action,72 and it is further supported by
Executive Branch acquiescence as more officials carry out executive actions.
In effect, when the President promulgates a constitutionally or statutorily
questionable executive order, but agency officials carry it out nonetheless, it
has survived the scrutiny of Hart’s theory and been recognized as law.
Executive and legislative acquiescence might be partially explained
through actions during crises. In our democratic government, Congress and
the President are ultimately beholden to the people. Because the people are
biased toward action, not deliberation, in turbulent times the Legislative and
Executive Branches may skip procedure in favor of action.73 As Professor
68
69
70
71
72
73

See Manheim & Watts, supra note 46, at 1764–65.
Proclamation No. 2,087, 48 Stat. 1744 (1934).
See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 311 (1936).
See Executive Order No. 11,615, 36 Fed. Reg. 15,729 (Aug. 15, 1971).
Duncan, supra note 41, at 374.
See id. at 411.
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John Duncan Jr. explains, in times of peace and economic security the people
believe decisive action is unnecessary, for there are no exigencies to justify
it.74 But if the people perceive immediate threats, they will demand speedy,
decisive responses. In these circumstances, the President “may have more
than the force of law behind him. He may very well have the force of the
nation (the people) behind him as well.” 75 The people’s desire for swift
action in crisis may drive legislators to acquiesce to expansive executive
orders, legitimizing such actions as law.
2. Signing Statements
Presidential signing statements 76 also produce uncertainty, evoking
scrutiny from scholars. 77 Scrutiny intensified with President George W.
Bush’s frequent use of signing statements to signal constitutional concerns
with legislation.78 Although signing statements likely do not create as much
uncertainty as executive orders—because unlike with executive orders, the
President does not presume to create primary rules in a signing

74

Id. at 407–08.
Id.
76 For an overview of signing statements, see TODD GARVEY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL33667,
PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 1–16
(2012). For a history of signing statements, see Faith Joseph Jackson, The Constitutionality of Presidential
Signing Statements: A Note on H.R. 5993 – The Presidential Signing Statements Act of 2008, 35 J. LEGIS.
1, 3–5 (2009), and Christopher S. Yoo, Presidential Signing Statements: A New Perspective, 164 U. PA.
L. REV. 1801, 1805–08 (2016).
77
See, e.g., Phillip J. Cooper, George W. Bush, Edgar Allan Poe, and the Use and Abuse of
Presidential Signing Statements, 35 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 515, 518 (2005) (noting that signing
statements are “not specifically constrained by any law or policy” and thus are “an excellent device to get
around the Congress”); PETER M. SHANE, MADISON’S NIGHTMARE: HOW EXECUTIVE POWER
THREATENS AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 132–42 (2009) (describing signing statements as “faux law”);
Louis Fisher, Signing Statements: Constitutional and Practical Limits, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 183,
191–92 (2007) (discussing multiple scholars’ constitutional critiques of signing statements).
78 See Charlie Savage, Bush Challenges Hundreds of Laws, BOS. GLOBE (Apr. 30, 2006),
http://archive.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2006/04/30/bush_challenges_hundreds_of_l
aws/ [https://perma.cc/D3L5-CDH2] (noting legal scholars’ concerns that Bush’s signing statements
signaled a “concerted effort to expand his power at the expense of Congress”); see also CHARLIE SAVAGE,
TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY AND THE SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 229–30 (2007) (noting the “outcry” from Congress over Bush’s use of signing statements).
75
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statement—debate continues. 79 And this debate has gone beyond heady
scholastic disputes.80
A recent example of uncertainty is President Trump’s signing statement
regarding the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA),81 which is
the most important piece of legislation dealing with national security
authorized each year by Congress. The White House expressed constitutional
concerns with over fifty sections of the NDAA, explaining their conflict with
the President’s understanding of his constitutional role and implying that the
White House need not obey them.82
Similarly, President Biden’s signing statement regarding the 2022
NDAA sparked another controversy.83 Forty-two organizations wrote a letter
to the White House challenging the President’s use of the signing statement
to assert his alleged authority to withhold national security information from
Congress.84 Several provisions of the Act mandate the Executive Branch to
report such information.85 Signing statements are an example of Congress
79 Compare Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. Posner, Presidential Signing Statements and Executive
Power, 23 CONST. COMMENT 307, 310–12 (2006), and Yoo, supra note 76, at 1834, and Keith E.
Whittington, Much Ado About Nothing: Signing Statements, Vetoes, and Presidential Constitutional
Interpretation, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1751, 1771, 1790–91 (2017) (all arguing that signing
statements are legal and useful for the President to express views about the constitutionality of various
bills), with Jackson, supra note 76, at 16 (arguing that the abusive use of signing statements is
constitutionally questionable).
80 The American Bar Association created a Task Force on Presidential Signing Statements and
Separation of Powers Doctrine in 2006, which unanimously concluded that the President should stop
using signing statements to express that he will not enforce a law. AM. BAR ASS’N, TASK FORCE ON
PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE: RECOMMENDATION
1 (2006), https://balkin.blogspot.com/aba.signing.statments.report.pdf [https://perma.cc/M8C5-VCGL];
see also Jackson, supra note 76, at 12.
81 Statement on Signing the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2019, 2018 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD201800533/pdf/DCPD-201800533.pdf [https://perma.cc/S5TY-K7E8].
82 See Charlie Savage, Trump Claims Power to Bypass Limits Set by Congress in Defense Bill, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/14/us/politics/trump-signing-statements.html
[https://perma.cc/Q2SF-6ZJQ]; see also Charles Tiefer, Trump Power Grab in Defense Bill Signing
Statement on Russia and Other Subjects, FORBES (Aug. 19, 2018, 11:24 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/charlestiefer/2018/08/19/trump-power-grab-in-defense-bill-signingstatement-on-russia-and-other-subjects/?sh=1406417a5059 [https://perma.cc/EYS9-YSMZ].
83 Statement by the President on S. 1605, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2022, 2021 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (Dec. 27, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingroom/statements-releases/2021/12/27/statement-by-the-president-on-s-1605-the-national-defenseauthorization-act-for-fiscal-year-2022/ [https://perma.cc/2M7C-FXLH].
84 Letter from Undersigned Organizations to Joseph Biden Jr., President of the United
States (Feb. 10, 2022), https://demandprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Org-Letter-on-NDAASigning-Statement-Letter-2_10_22.pdf [https://perma.cc/5FMC-NWQ9].
85 See Cavan Kharrazian, 42 Orgs Challenge Biden’s NDAA Signing Statement, DEMAND
PROGRESS (Feb. 11, 2022), https://demandprogress.org/42-orgs-challenge-bidens-ndaa-signing-
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directing the President through legislation, but then the Executive insisting
that he does not need to listen to them. The rule of recognition cannot account
for two equally legitimate parts of the government asserting conflicting
obligations over each other.
3. Office of Legal Counsel
Another source of uncertainty is Department of Justice memoranda,
particularly from the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC). The Office of Legal
Counsel advises the President and other executive agencies on legal
matters.86 Although this advisory authority is technically delegated to the
Attorney General,87 the Attorney General in turn delegates it to the Assistant
Attorney General, who heads OLC. 88 As discussed above, presidential
directives can take a variety of forms and accomplish a wide range of
policies. The Obama Administration unilaterally suspended the deportation
of undocumented immigrants who arrived in the United States as children,89
and authorized a drone strike on U.S. citizen Anwar al-Awlaki.90 President
Trump unilaterally restricted travel and immigration from certain countries91
and directed the Treasury Department not to punitively tax religious
organizations that speak on political issues. 92 OLC analyzed all of these
actions and blessed them as legitimate.93
Despite its explicitly advisory role, OLC legal guidance is treated like
binding authority. For example, consider the influence that a DOJ
memorandum concluding that a sitting president could not be indicted
exerted on the Mueller Report. Since OLC released this memorandum in

statement/ [https://perma.cc/NM3W-4JFG]. This example hints at the transparency problems that can
persist when uncertainty exists around reporting requirement laws.
86 Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/olc [https://perma.cc/
ZS95-P4JD].
87 28 U.S.C. §§ 511–513.
88 28 C.F.R. § 0.25(a).
89 Press Release, Off. of the Press Sec’y, White House, Remarks by the President on Immigration
(June 15, 2012, 2:09 PM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/15/remarkspresident-immigration [https://perma.cc/2PYA-6NRU].
90 Conor Friedersdorf, How Team Obama Justifies the Killing of a 16-Year-Old American, ATLANTIC
(Oct. 24, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/10/how-team-obama-justifies-thekilling-of-a-16-year-old-american/264028 [https://perma.cc/HL3E-GDD4].
91 See Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977 (Jan. 27, 2017); Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed.
Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017).
92 See Exec. Order No. 13,798, 82 Fed. Reg. 21,675 (May 4, 2017).
93 See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Secret U.S. Memo Made Legal Case to Kill a Citizen, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
8, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/09/world/middleeast/secret-us-memo-made-legal-case-tokill-a-citizen.html [https://perma.cc/8S2X-V5DV] (discussing OLC’s memorandum justifying the alAwlaki strike); see also Adoree Kim, The Partiality Norm: Systematic Deference in the Office of Legal
Counsel, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 757, 758 (2018) (compiling these examples and relating them to OLC).
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1973 and updated it in 2000,94 whether a president can be indicted has been
extensively debated.95 Many believe Robert Mueller stopped short of saying
President Trump committed the crime of obstruction of justice because this
OLC guidance was treated as authoritative.96
If, according to Hart’s theory, what constitutes law can be discerned
both by reference to secondary rules and by observing the behavior of
officials within the legal system, Mueller’s apparent decision to follow this
OLC guidance implicitly treats the memorandum as law. One scholar admits
that the “bindingness of the Attorney General’s (or, in the modern era,
OLC’s) legal advice has long been uncertain,” but this is not a problem
“because by longstanding tradition the advice is treated as binding.” 97
Professor Morrison describes this practice of treating OLC opinions as
binding as something OLC is eager to create for itself: “OLC protects that
tradition today by generally refusing to provide advice if there is any doubt
about whether the requesting entity will follow it. This guards against
‘advice-shopping by entities willing to abide only by advice they like.’”98
OLC fosters acceptance of its opinions so that it is not ignored,99 and directly
plays into Hart’s definition of the rule of recognition as accepting as law that
which is accepted by government officials.

94 A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution, 24 Op. O.L.C. 222,
222 (2000).
95 See, e.g., W. Burlette Carter, Can a Sitting President Be Federally Prosecuted? The Founders’
Answer, 62 HOW. L.J. 331, 337–39 (2019) (discussing differing legal arguments for whether a sitting
President may or may not be constitutionally prosecuted); Keith King, Indicting the President: Can a
Sitting President Be Criminally Indicted?, 30 SW. U. L. REV. 417, 417 (2001) (noting that “the issue of
whether the President may be indicted while in office remains unclear”).
96 Fred Barbash, Justice Department Opinions Take On the Force of Law — But Are Not, in Fact,
the Law, WASH. POST (May 31, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/justicedepartment-opinions-take-on-the-force-of-law--but-are-not-in-fact-the-law/2019/05/30/f4efe222-828011e9-933d-7501070ee669_story.html [https://perma.cc/FC3Z-MYM4] (explaining that Robert Mueller
asserted that the prohibition on indicting presidents for federal crimes is a “long-standing department
policy”); see also Ranae Reints, Why Couldn’t Mueller Indict Trump? This DOJ Policy Prevented Him,
FORTUNE (May 30, 2019, 5:37 AM), https://fortune.com/2019/05/30/indict-a-sitting-president-dojpolicy/ [https://perma.cc/TS4Q-U3J4] (reporting that Mueller said indicting President Trump was “not
an option we could consider”).
97 Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1448,
1464 (2010).
98 Id. (quoting Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands,
103 MICH. L. REV. 676, 711 (2005)).
99 Id. at 1464–65 (explaining that creating an atmosphere of acceptance around OLC opinions “helps
ensure that OLC’s answers matter. An agency displeased with OLC’s advice cannot simply ignore the
advice. The agency might construe any ambiguity in OLC’s advice to its liking, and in some cases might
even ask OLC to reconsider its advice. But the settled practice of treating OLC’s advice as binding ensures
it is not simply ignored.”).
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There is also uncertainty regarding the President’s flexibility to accept
or ignore OLC advice, including whether the President could disregard an
OLC opinion purely on policy grounds or if they would have to justify the
rejection by stating that OLC erred in its legal analysis.100 Either way, if the
President disagreed with OLC’s legal guidance for policy reasons, they could
pretextually disagree on legal grounds to pursue their policy goals. On top of
all this, OLC legal opinions are not always public, rendering the process
opaque and allowing presidents to hide behind an excuse without the broader
legal community analyzing the opinion’s legal reasoning.101
Overall, many presidential actions have the force of law despite fitting
uneasily within our constitutional system. The rule of recognition is meant
to provide clarity. Yet these examples illustrate the difficulties of reconciling
many of these actions with a coherent conception of the U.S. rule of
recognition.
B. Administrative Agencies
Administrative agencies, which have come to exercise increasing
amounts of executive power since the New Deal, 102 create further legal
uncertainty. The advent of muscular administrative agencies has caused legal
scholars and courts to grapple with the constitutional implications of agency
authority,103 but no scholars have sought to make sense of agency actions

100

See id. at 1466 (“Although his oath of office obliges him to uphold the Constitution, it is not
obvious he would violate that oath by pursuing policies that he thinks are plausibly constitutional even if
he has not concluded they fit his best view of the law. It is not clear, in other words, that the President’s
oath commits him to seeking and adhering to a single best view of the law, as opposed to any reasonable
or plausible view held in good faith.”).
101 Harold Hongju Koh, Protecting the Office of Legal Counsel from Itself, 15 CARDOZO L. REV.
513, 515,517 (1993). See id. at 517–20 for an example of confidential OLC opinions having a real effect
on Haitian refugee policy.
102 Maimon Schwarzschild, Points of Crisis or, Is It All Over?, 56 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1069, 1079
(2019) (“The growing power of administrative agencies in the United States is fairly well known. Federal
administrative agencies began on a modest scale in the late nineteenth century, grew somewhat during
the Progressive Era in the early twentieth century, and expanded dramatically in the 1930s under the New
Deal; their powers have expanded further since the 1960s.”); see also Christopher DeMuth, Can the
Administrative State Be Tamed?, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 121, 124–27 (2016).
103 Compare Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2130 (2019) (defending the modern
administrative state against charges of unconstitutional delegations of power), and Sophia Z. Lee, Our
Administered Constitution: Administrative Constitutionalism from the Founding to the Present, 167 U.
PA. L. REV. 1699, 1700 (2019) (asserting that agencies have played an important role in our constitutional
order since the founding), with Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 487 (2001) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (questioning whether the modern nondelegation doctrine prevents all unconstitutional
delegations of legislative power), and Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State,
107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1231 (1994) (arguing that the post-New Deal administrative state is
unconstitutional).
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through Hart’s rule of recognition. The following is an attempt to do
just that.
1. The Administrative Procedure Act and Other Agency Regulations
Any discussion of administrative agency action must begin with what
some call the constitution of administrative law: 104 the Administrative
Procedure Act.105 The U.S. rule of recognition, whether it be the Constitution
or otherwise, can likely account for a large portion of agency action through
the APA, which provides a statutory basis for agency rules and decisions.106
But even the Supreme Court has struggled to make sense of agency actions
that fall outside the typical APA process. For example, the Court has
declined to give Chevron deference to agency interpretations where there is
“no indication that Congress intended such a ruling to carry the force of
law.”107 This inquiry invokes Hart’s theory because whether an action carries
the force of law is the exact question the rule of recognition is intended to
answer. The Court initially extended deference to agency actions that went
through APA notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication.108 But
even when the agency circumvents APA-prescribed processes, the Court
sometimes still defers to the agency, further complicating the picture of
which agency actions carry the force of law.109
Through the APA and organic statutes, agencies exercise legislatively
delegated power. In this regard, the APA makes agencies analogous to Hart’s
Oxfordshire Country Council, 110 which has valid primary rulemaking
authority granted by Parliament. But there are still many agency actions not
contemplated by the APA that seemingly wield the same authority. As thenProfessor Elena Kagan remarked after her tenure in the Clinton
Administration, the President’s aggressive control of agencies “makes
104 See, e.g., Mila Sohoni, The Administrative Constitution in Exile, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 923,
931–33 (2016).
105 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (1968).
106 For a contrary argument, Professor Michael Ray Harris uses the example of the modern
administrative state to demonstrate that the rule of recognition in the United States is not simply the
Constitution. Though it has strong derivative support from the Constitution, the administrative state lacks
the express constitutional legitimacy of Article I’s ability to make law. Michael Ray Harris,
Environmental Deliberative Democracy and the Search for Administrative Legitimacy: A Legal
Positivism Approach, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 343, 367–70 (2011).
107 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001).
108 Id. at 230 n.12 (listing the cases in which the Court gave notice-and-comment rulemaking and
formal adjudications Chevron deference).
109 See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222, 225 (2002) (explaining that the “presence or absence
of notice-and-comment rulemaking” is not “dispositive” and holding that an agency action still receives
deference despite not going through notice-and-comment rulemaking based on a multifactor test showing
that the interpretation had the force of law).
110 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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presidential intervention in regulatory matters ever more routine and agency
acceptance of this intervention ever more ready.” 111 These observations
about the effects of active presidential control have turned out to be true.
Consider the fact that the DACA 112 controversy was initiated by an
executive memorandum from the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS). 113 President Obama publicly announced the new program and
certainly supported it, but he never signed an executive order to set this in
motion; it all came from DHS.114 DAPA115 came about the same way—DHS
issued a new memorandum implementing DAPA the same day Barack
Obama announced his plan for immigration on television.116 The Founders
likely did not envision such swift, unilateral policymaking by executive
agencies. As Professors Lisa Manheim and Kathryn A. Watts explain, the
uncertainty surrounding DACA and DAPA’s legitimacy even extended to
coverage of the announcement, as news outlets mistakenly thought President

111

Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2299 (2001).
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals. For a thorough explanation of DACA, see Naomi Cobb,
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA): A Non-Legislative Means to an End That Misses the
Bull’s-Eye, 15 SCHOLAR: ST. MARY’S L. REV. ON RACE & SOC. JUST. 651, 652 (2013) (explaining that
“DACA is a non-legislative policy directive by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) guiding its
departments” to defer action “against certain young people,” which “essentially means that the
government will defer commencing removal proceedings and will temporarily terminate removal
proceedings that have already begun for those individuals, which meet the criteria established in the
memorandum.”). See also Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals: A Q&A Guide, AM. IMMIGR.
COUNCIL (Aug. 17, 2012), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/deferred-actionchildhood-arrivals-qa-guide [https://perma.cc/449J-KPBW]. See generally Alicia Triche, Who Is a
Dreamer? The Criteria, History, and Legal Authority of “Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals,” FED.
LAW., June 2013, at 20.
113 Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to
David V. Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot. et al. (June 15, 2012),
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-tous-as-children.pdf [http://perma.cc/8U86-X7EF]; see Manheim & Watts, supra note 46, at 1753–54.
114 Manheim & Watts, supra note 46, at 1753–54.
115 Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents. DAPA would have
expanded DACA’s eligibility standards to parents and adults, whereas before it only covered children.
But a nationwide injunction stopped DAPA from ever going into effect. See Olga Y. Kuchins, Out of the
Shadows: Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, Deferred Action to Parents of Americans and Lawful
Permanent Residents, and Executive Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, 43 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 705, 712–13 (2016); see also 2014 Executive Actions on Immigration, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR.
SERVS. (Apr. 15, 2015), http://www.uscis.gov/immigrationaction [https://perma.cc/92T4-NZF4]
(explaining that President Obama announced DAPA after immigration advocates pushed for further
change and expansion of DACA); Immigration Action, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Nov. 10, 2021),
http://www.dhs.gov/immigration-action [https://perma.cc/4AQA-HRKT] (describing planned eligibility
expansion for DACA and DAPA).
116 See Press Release, Off. of the Press Sec’y, White House, Remarks by the President in Address to
the Nation on Immigration (Nov. 20, 2014, 8:01 PM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/thepress-office/2014/11/20/remarks-president-address-nation-immigration [http://perma.cc/S6XA-AU3C];
Manheim & Watts, supra note 46, at 1758.
112
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Obama had issued DAPA as an executive order. 117 Then the Trump
Administration attempted to rescind DACA through two additional DHS
memoranda, the first one by Elaine Duke118 and the second by Kirstjen M.
Nielsen.119 Did this require any action from Congress or even the President
to establish or overturn a sweeping federal program? The answer: no. In
rescinding DACA, the only action from President Trump was a tweet.120
Two recent—and controversial—examples regarding the uncertain
power of administrative agencies dealt with two COVID-19-related
regulations, one issued by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) 121 and the other promulgated by the Department of Labor’s
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). 122 In both cases,
the Supreme Court’s per curiam opinions expressed noticeable skepticism
about the agencies’ claimed scope of authority. In the CDC case, when the
congressionally enacted nationwide moratorium on evictions expired
without renewal, the CDC promulgated a new one sua sponte.123 The Court
struck down this regulation, reasoning that “it is a stretch to maintain that
[the statute] gives the CDC the authority to impose this eviction
moratorium,” and “[e]ven if the text were ambiguous, the sheer scope of the

117 Manheim & Watts, supra note 46, at 1758 (citing How Will Obama’s Executive Order Affect
Cache Valley’s Immigrant Families, Students?, HERALD JOURNAL (Nov. 29, 2014),
https://www.hjnews.com/allaccess/how-will-obamas-executive-order-affect-cache-valley-s-immigrantfamilies-students/article_5955d14e-7832-11e4-812a-4f26993a2ab7.html
[https://perma.cc/A4KP9AJD]); President Takes Executive Action on Immigration; Implores Congress to Pass Bill, LAW FIRM
NEWSWIRE (Dec. 30, 2014), https://www.lawfirmnewswire.com/2014/12/president-takes-executiveaction-on-immigration-implores-congress-to-pass-bill/ [https://perma.cc/2EQE-Q7RR]; see also Jennifer
Rubin, The GOP Should Look to the Heartland, WASH. POST (Nov. 24, 2014, 12:15 PM),
[http://perma.cc/MX4T-VGUA]; H. Roy Kaplan, Sorting Fears from Facts About Hispanic Migrants,
TAMPA BAY TIMES (Dec. 27, 2014), https://www.tampabay.com/opinion/columns/column-sorting-fearsfrom-facts-about-hispanic-migrants/2211579 [http://perma.cc/J8XL-4E6N] (“President Barack Obama’s
executive order on immigration was greeted with mixed reactions.”).
118 Memorandum from Elaine C. Duke, Acting Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to James W.
McCament, Acting Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs. et al. (Sept. 5, 2017),
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/09/05/memorandum-rescission-daca [http://perma.cc/GVQ5-BAEC].
119 Memorandum from Kirstjen M. Nielsen, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (June 22, 2018),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/18_0622_S1_Memorandum_DACA.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K2T8-7SAU].
120 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Sept. 5, 2017, 5:38 PM), https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/905228667336499200 [http://perma.cc/KNJ2-5SPY] (“Congress now has 6
months to legalize DACA (something the Obama Administration was unable to do). If they can’t, I will
revisit this issue!”).
121 Temporary Halt in Residential Evictions To Prevent the Further Spread of COVID-19, 85 Fed.
Reg. 55,292 (Sept. 4, 2020).
122 COVID-19 Vaccination and Testing; Emergency Temporary Standard, 86 Fed. Reg. 61,402
(Nov. 5, 2021).
123 See Ala. Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 141 S. Ct. 2485, 2486 (2021).
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CDC’s claimed authority . . . counsel[s] against the Government’s
interpretation.”124
The Court responded similarly to the OSHA emergency rule, which
would have required “all employers with at least 100 employees ‘to ensure
their workforces [were] fully vaccinated or show a negative test at least once
a week’” and would have applied to roughly 84 million employees.125 The
debate between the majority and the dissent essentially turned on Hart’s
question about the Oxfordshire Country Council126: Had Congress delegated
this power to the agency? Concluding that a vaccine mandate fell outside the
scope of addressing occupational safety and hazards, the Court struck down
the regulation.127
These two examples showcase a three-step dance between the three
branches of government as they struggle to determine the appropriate reach
and authority of administrative agencies. First Congress acts or does not act,
then the Executive Branch responds accordingly through agency action, and
finally the Supreme Court determines whether that action is valid.
Regardless of one’s views on the merits of these decisions, it is far from
incontrovertible to say that uncertainty does not exist in each of these
three steps.128

124

Id. at 2488–89.
NFIB v. OSHA, 142 S. Ct. 661, 663 (2022) (per curiam) (quoting Remarks on the COVID-19
Response and National Vaccination Efforts, 2021 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 775 (Sept. 9, 2021),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-202100725/pdf/DCPD-202100725.pdf [https://perma.cc/
DVM9-3PDW]).
126 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
127 NFIB, 142 S. Ct. at 665 (“The question, then, is whether the Act plainly authorizes the Secretary’s
mandate. It does not. The Act empowers the Secretary to set workplace safety standards, not broad public
health measures.”).
128 See, e.g., Scott Bomboy, Current Constitutional Issues Related to Vaccine Mandates, NAT’L
CONST. CTR.: CONST. DAILY (Aug. 6, 2021), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/current-constitutionalissues-related-to-vaccine-mandates [https://perma.cc/73U5-Q5GC] (detailing the controversy around a
federal vaccine-mandate policy); Christina Pazzanese, How Far Can Biden Go?, HARV. GAZETTE (July
30, 2021), https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2021/07/what-can-a-president-mandate-during-acrisis/ [https://perma.cc/UD54-2ZER] (examining the limits of presidential power in a crisis). Compare
David B. Rivkin Jr. & Andrew M. Grossman, The Vaccine Mandate Case May Mark the End of the
‘Work-Around’ Era, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 6, 2022, 6:52 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/end-ofwork-arounds-biden-executive-order-vaccine-mandate-covid-omicron-supreme-court-11641505106
[https://perma.cc/HDT6-7V96] (arguing that the Executive Branch violates separation of
powers by imposing a vaccine mandate), with Kimberly Wehle, The Vaccine-Mandate Case Is
About
So
Much
More
than
Vaccine
Mandates, ATLANTIC
(Jan.
7,
2022),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/01/scotus-vaccine-mandate-case-executive-branchpower/621156/ [https://perma.cc/3M2L-PWQH] (asserting that the Executive Branch does have the
authority to impose a vaccine mandate).
125
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2. “Dear Colleague” Letters
Agencies continue to set policy well outside the walls of Congress in
the form of “Dear Colleague” letters. The Obama Administration’s 2011
letter from the Department of Education (DOE) establishing new standards
and procedures for universities to follow when handling sexual assault
allegations is one of the most notable epistolary policymaking examples.129
After it was issued, uncertainty arose in the legal system over whether the
letter could legitimately promulgate new policy, and members of Congress
criticized the administration’s response as unconvincing.130 Despite having
five years to come up with a reason, DOE justified the policy in a single
paragraph from the head of DOE’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR), stating
that the “2011 letter merely ‘reminded’ colleges and universities of a
requirement to use the preponderance of evidence standard” in sexual assault
cases brought before the universities.131 The government official asserted that
this was just a reminder because the preponderance standard had already
been established in “two unpublished letters [to] individual universities.”132
Adding to the uncertainty, OCR did not follow up with more detailed
guidance until 2014.133
No section of Hart’s work addressed what his theory would make of a
letter from an administrative agency promulgating a new policy with
authority based on two previous letters sent to private actors that were not
available to the public. So the question remains: is this law? Despite
widespread criticism of OCR’s letter, 134 officials and universities began
129 Letter from Russlynn Ali, Assistant Sec’y, Off. for Civ. Rts., U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to
Colleagues (Apr. 4, 2011), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C9P7-KJFT].
130 See Letter from Senator James Lankford to John B. King Jr., Acting Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Educ.
(Jan. 7, 2016), https://www.lankford.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Sen.%20Lankford%20letter%20to%20
Dept.%20of%20Education%201.7.16.pdf [https://perma.cc/N4JC-G3M9].
131 K.C. Johnson & Stuart Taylor, The Path to Obama’s “Dear Colleague” Letter, WASH. POST
(Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/01/31/the-path-toobamas-dear-colleague-letter/ [https://perma.cc/47UG-WYSF].
132 Id. Not to mention that these unpublished letters raise the same issue: How can we tell whether
they can legitimately promulgate new policy? See also Peter Schmidt, Education Dept. Defends Its
Approach to Title IX in Face of Senate Pressure, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Feb. 19, 2016),
https://www.chronicle.com/article/education-dept-defends-its-approach-to-title-ix-in-face-of-senatepressure/ [https://perma.cc/GT8P-2J3P].
133 OFF. FOR CIV. RTS., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON TITLE IX AND
SEXUAL VIOLENCE (2014), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-201404-title-ix.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GJ48-YMP4].
134 See e.g., Walter Olson, Reining In Government by Dear Colleague Letter: An Update, CATO
INST.: CATO AT LIBERTY (July 16, 2019, 3:38 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/restraining-governmentdear-colleague-letter-update [https://perma.cc/TJH8-9HJ] (criticizing how these letters “grab new powers
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complying. OCR was conducting “hundreds of investigations of prominent
colleges, and [issuing] scores of legally binding resolution agreements.”135
Once compliance with the letter became widespread, Hart’s theory accepted
this DOE Dear Colleague letter as law.136 Yet this result seems intuitively
unsatisfactory.137
*

*

*

I offer these admittedly inexhaustive examples to highlight the vast
array of “law” emanating from the Executive Branch. If the rule of
recognition holds weight in reality, then it must be able to make sense of
these various sources of primary rules. It seems dissatisfying to say that we
must accept all of these executive actions as law so long as the officials we
observe acquiesce to them. Perhaps Hart would simply answer, “yes, that is
what we must do.” But that seems incomplete. Instead, we should dig deeper
into what the realities of our modern legal world mean for our government
and the rule of recognition. At the very least, four questions should be raised.
First, do these observations reveal something wrong with the operations of
our Executive Branch? There is a strong argument that they do. Second, do
these observations reveal a flaw in Hart’s theory? If not a flaw, they show
that the theory needs to be reformed in some ways. Third, do these
and ban new things in the guise of interpreting existing law”); Stuart Taylor Jr. & K.C. Johnson, The New
Standard for Campus Sexual Assault: Guilty Until Proven Innocent, NAT’L REV. (Dec. 30, 2015),
https://www.nationalreview.com/2015/12/campus-rape-courts-republicans-resisting/ [https://perma.cc/
BWQ3-48SV] (critiquing the OCR’s letter as containing “attacks on due process” and as a form of
“bureaucratic tyranny”).
135 R. Shep Melnick, Analyzing the Department of Education’s Final Title IX Rules on Sexual
Misconduct, BROOKINGS (June 11, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/analyzing-thedepartment-of-educations-final-title-ix-rules-on-sexual-misconduct/ [https://perma.cc/2PAR-7WAG];
see also Max Larkin, The Obama Administration Remade Sexual Assault Enforcement on Campus. Could
Trump Unmake It?, WBUR (Nov. 25, 2016), https://www.wbur.org/edify/2016/11/25/title-ix-obamatrump [https://perma.cc/R9DP-VQ72] (“American higher education has gotten the message that the
White House and the Department of Education were sending — and a lot has changed.”).
136 It should be noted that the Trump administration moved away from this policy, but then
the Biden administration restored it through yet another Dear Colleague letter. See Seth B. Orkand &
Kathleen E. Dion, President Directs Department of Education to Begin Dismantling Trump-Era
Title IX Sexual Misconduct Regulations, NAT’L L. REV. (Mar. 9, 2021), https://www.natlawreview.com/
article/president-directs-department-education-to-begin-dismantling-trump-era-title-ix
[https://perma.cc/MS8R-E7CD].
137 A full exploration is beyond the scope of this Note, but if Dear Colleague letters are an obscure
and questionable source of law, then SEC “no-action” letters may be as well. These are letters from
SEC staff offering guidance on how securities law would apply in specific cases. See No Action
Letters, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersnoactionhtm.html
[https://perma.cc/GYD7-EXN9]. No-action letters often have the effect of law, as “regulated entities tend
to treat them as blanket permission for the industry to take the action described in the letter.” Paul S.
Atkins, Speech by SEC Commissioner: Charles Hamilton Houston Lecture, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N
(Apr. 4, 2005), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch040405psa.htm [https://perma.cc/KYS8-SXLN].
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observations reveal that the rule of recognition is failing to resolve
uncertainty? At a minimum, it is not providing as clear a picture of what the
law is as Hart may claim. And fourth, do these observations give us reason
to question the separation thesis of legal positivism? There is robust
reasoning that might give legal positivists pause on this question.
III. DANGEROUS UNCERTAINTY IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
Perhaps these observations about the Executive Branch reveal no flaws
in Hart’s theory. Perhaps they simply expose problems with the operation
and actions of our Executive Branch. Hart may argue that the rule of
recognition is working—we observe official behavior to identify primary
rules when they arise out of statutory or constitutionally uncertain origins.
According to Hart, the disputes that exist over many executive actions are
academic or normative discussions that do not bear upon the validity of the
law because these executive actions are legitimized when the public and
government officials accept them.138 In reality, there is no uncertainty—law
is being identified as it is created, and the rule of recognition is therefore
doing its job. If this is the case, then perhaps the dissatisfaction should not
be aimed at Hart’s theory but instead should be aimed at the actions of the
Executive Branch. If the rule of recognition is working to identify the law,
then any problems with what “law” is should be taken up with the President.
This Part now shifts focus to what these observations reveal about potential
problems within the Executive Branch.
The primary problem with modern Executive Branch actions is that the
separation of powers outlined in our Constitution does not allow complete
legitimation by acquiescence. If law is created simply by observing official
behavior, then this renders the Constitution’s bicameralism and presentment
requirements utterly superfluous and unleashes government action beyond
the bounds of the Constitution’s enumerated powers. James Madison told the
people of New York before they voted to ratify the Constitution that one of
the document’s virtues was the separation of powers, for “[t]here can be no
liberty, where the Legislative and Executive powers are united in the same
person, or body of magistrates.”139 Madison also expected the Legislature to
be a “vortex” that swept all into its power if left unchecked.140
Madison was right to predict a vortex, but he was wrong about its
source. The Executive Branch has proven to be the branch that has pulled
138 H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593,
626–29 (1958).
139 THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 299 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
140 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 306 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“The legislative department is
everywhere extending the sphere of its activity, and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex.”).
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everything into its power. The above examples show that through
congressional delegation, acquiescence, or some other form of legislative
drift, the Executive Branch has been allowed to issue an increasing number
of primary rules. Though our Constitution gives the President the ability to
execute primary rules, it is another thing entirely for the President, cabinet
officials, and even administrative agency staff to create primary rules. As
discussed, Hart might accept these unilateral rules as law, so the problem
must lie in how our legal system has allowed this transformation to happen.
It is not a foregone conclusion that the shift in policymaking from
Congress to agencies, often under the guise of interpreting the law, is
necessarily a problem.141 It might simply be an inevitable byproduct of an
increasingly complex society relying on a swift and nimble Executive
Branch to do more legislating. While the Framers certainly contemplated the
President’s energy,142 whether they intended for this energy to generate such
far-reaching policymaking is controversial.143
It is worth a few words to tease out the implications these executive
actions have for democracy, transparency, and accountability.144 Something
is lost from a democratic standpoint when an executive action that affects
millions of people is legitimized through society observing official
behavior. 145 This is especially true when the decision-making and
141 See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law
Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 221 (1994) (arguing that it is consistent with the Constitution’s separation of powers
that it is “‘emphatically the province and duty’ of the executive department . . . ‘to say what the law is’”
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)).
142 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 421 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“Energy in the Executive is a
leading character in the definition of good government. It is essential to the protection of the community
against foreign attacks; it is not less essential to the steady administration of the laws; to the protection of
property against those irregular and high-handed combinations which sometimes interrupt the ordinary
course of justice; to the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction, and
of anarchy.”).
143 Compare Heidi Kitrosser, Rethinking Presidential Supremacy, 57 WAYNE L. REV. 227, 232
(2011) (asserting that “it was equally crucial to the Founders to ensure that the destructive potential of
[the President’s energy] would be checked”), and Deborah Pearlstein, The Constitution and Executive
Competence in the Post-Cold War World, 38 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 547, 548–49 (2007) (arguing
against the view that Hamilton’s words in Federalist No. 70 are a basis for expansive executive power),
with Jide Nzelibe & John Yoo, Rational War and Constitutional Design, 115 YALE L.J. 2512, 2523
(2006) (arguing for expansive executive power based in part on the energy of the President). For an
overview of this debate, see generally Sotirios A. Barber & James E. Fleming, Constitutional Theory and
the Future of the Unitary Executive, 59 EMORY L.J. 459 (2009).
144 Though a whole paper could be written about this topic and its many nuances, I only explore
some of the surface-level implications here.
145 See Jennifer Shkabatur, Transparency With(out) Accountability: Open Government in the United
States, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 79, 83 (2012) (“Throughout American history, it has been well
understood that democracies die behind closed doors, and that to be held accountable and to perform well,
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implementation processes behind these actions are almost completely
obscure compared to the transparency required of Congress.146 The primary,
and perhaps only, legitimating source in a democracy should be the vote of
the people and the actions of their representatives, because elected
representatives must respond to the electorate or else they can be held
accountable at the ballot box.147 When unelected agency officials or White
House lawyers are the ones “making law” according to Hart’s theory, robust
accountability and transparency safeguards deteriorate.148
Perhaps Hart’s theory is solid, and the numerous executive actions
discussed above are all “law” for practical purposes. If so, then the
dissatisfaction is with the problems in our current legal system and perhaps
they call for a return to clear separation of powers. but it is beyond the scope
of this Note to propose a solution to this problem. The next Part argues that
while reforms are needed to restore our separation of powers, there remain
criticisms of Hart’s theory worth considering.
IV. WHAT THESE OBSERVATIONS TELL US ABOUT HART’S THEORY
Although flaws in our legal system may stem in part from a distortion
of power between the branches, the above examples still reveal flaws in the
viability of Hart’s theory. To see why, consider our village again. Assume

government must be visible to the public.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (first quoting Detroit Free
Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 683 (6th Cir. 2002); and then quoting Mark Fenster, Seeing the State:
Transparency as Metaphor, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 617, 619 (2010)).
146 See Robert L. Glicksman, Shuttered Government, 62 ARIZ. L. REV. 573, 575 (2020)
(“Accountable governance is particularly important when public policy decisions are made by
administrative agencies composed of appointed, rather than elected, officials.”). Professor Glicksman’s
assertion touches upon a multifaceted debate that has been ongoing for decades. See, e.g., Richard B.
Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1671 (1975)
(expressing concern over the “exercise of power over private interests by officials not otherwise formally
accountable”); Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse,
103 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2073 (2005) (disagreeing with “the idea that elected officials—legislators and
the chief executive—are accountable to the people, while officials who obtained their position
by appointment or examination are not”). For my present purposes, it is enough to highlight the
potential implications of the differences in accountability and transparency between Congress and
administrative agencies.
147 See Adam Candeub, Transparency in the Administrative State, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 385, 410–11
(2013) (arguing that legislatures “have the incentive to make compromises that advance the greatest good
for the greatest number” or else the “electorate kicks them out,” while agencies, on the other hand, have
much more “obscure” incentives that likely include “maximiz[ing] their own job security or even the
chance for employment with the entities they regulate” and “short-term political advancement”).
148 Some have argued that transparency is essential to the administrative state’s legitimacy. See
Wendy Wagner, Katherine Barnes & Lisa Peters, Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA’s
Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 100 (2011) (“Open government and equal access
to decisionmaking processes are cornerstones that ensure an accountable and democratically legitimate
Fourth Branch.”).
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the Agriculture Committee never issued guidance on the planting and
harvesting of a new fast-growing breed of squash. Instead, an individual
farmer who wants to grow this super squash submits an inquiry to the
Committee, which, being extremely busy, delegates it to a low-level staffer.
The staffer writes a letter stating that the current regulations allow the farmer
to grow the squash. Word quickly spreads amongst the farming community,
and the entire industry begins growing the super squash. Once the Committee
accepts this transition to super-squash, Hart’s theory forces us to conclude
that this staffer promulgated a “law.”
If a theory is so broad that it accepts even this action as a “law,” this
raises questions about whether that theory is viable. The above scenario
reduces our legal system to one of custom-based behavioral observation—to
tell what the law is, simply observe official behavior. Where government
actions are accepted by society, that is the law. A system of law-byobservation strays dangerously far from the sophisticated concept of legal
systems being a union of primary and secondary rules. The problem all of
these questions pose for Hart’s theory is that such a system does not need
secondary rules.149 There is no need for rules of adjudication, change, and
recognition when observing official behavior will suffice to adjudge,
transform, and settle the law. Accordingly, the main question is: what do
these real-world situations suggest about Hart’s theory of the rule of
recognition? First, do they reveal that the rule of recognition is
fundamentally flawed? Second, is the rule of recognition failing to serve as
an uncertainty-settling device? And third, what does this all mean for legal
positivism? While it is beyond the scope of this Note to provide a conclusive
answer to each of these inquiries, this Note aims to establish that each merits
full consideration in future scholarship.
If Hart’s theory is too simple to map onto our complicated legal system,
is it therefore fundamentally flawed? Not quite. An examination of the
current rule of recognition in the United States reveals two propositions.
First, there is not one singular rule of recognition as Hart might argue, but
rather multiple. Second and relatedly, multiple communities determine what
the law is, not any single community.
First, there is no reason to think that the rule that validates a governor’s
executive orders is the same as the one that validates Congress’s laws.150 As

See Harris, supra note 106, at 370 n.158 (asserting that the “notion that the administrative state is
a legitimate source of primary rules would eviscerate Hart’s basic understanding of the rule of
recognition” because it would return us to an understanding that law is whatever the government
commands it is).
150 Shapiro, supra note 24, at 12. Professor Shapiro attributes this idea originally to Professors John
Finnis and Joseph Raz.
149
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is clear from the multiple sources of law in our complex legal system, we
need multiple rules of recognition. For example, an attempt to define a
unitary rule of recognition from the Constitution—say, that law is that which
is passed by both houses of Congress and then either signed by the President
or passed over a veto with two-thirds support—does not describe the other
facets of recognition we give to the Judicial and Executive Branches.
Furthermore, not only is there more than one rule of recognition per
legal system, but there are also multiple “recognitional communities”—
communities whose behavior determines whether an edict is law.151 Some
scholars have argued that law under Hart’s theory can be “group-relative,”
because different groups will evaluate and validate different rules. 152 One
recognitional community may exist at the state level while another exists at
the federal level, or one community might evaluate the Judiciary while
another evaluates the Executive. 153 On this view, we should view a legal
system “not as a set of laws recognized by all the primary law-applying
[officials] instituted under it” but rather as a set of overlapping rules, “each
recognized by one or more of the organs instituted under it.”154
Applying the theory of recognitional communities to the example of
Trump’s tweets reveals why we need further elaboration on Hart’s theory.
There the recognitional community seemed to be the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The only reason Trump’s tweets did not create a more consequential problem
was that the Joint Chiefs of Staff refuted them relatively quickly. The fact
that the Joint Chiefs’ statement essentially settled the issue shows that they
were seen as the authoritative recognitional community on this issue. This
demonstrates the need to further develop Hart’s theory of the rule of
recognition to fit more neatly with modern legal realities.

151 Adler, supra note 38, at 727 (“No single community defines the law of a given legal system. In
particular, there is no canonical group whose practices are the foundation for U.S. law. Propositions about
U.S. constitutional law and, derivatively, U.S. law more generally are true or false relative to the practices
of a stipulated group.”).
152 Id. at 745. Professor Adler explains that it is “a category mistake[] to presuppose that there is a
single, canonical manner of dress, eating, or sexual behavior that is ‘socially appropriate’ for a given
person at a given time.” His proposal is “to extend this group-relative understanding of social ‘oughts’
from nonlegal ‘oughts’ to law itself.” Id.
153 Professor Adler notes:

There is no single, canonical recognitional community for U.S. law. Rather, Supreme Court
practice will ground one set of answers to the questions, one body of U.S. constitutional law (and
derivatively U.S. law); presidential practice, a different body of U.S. constitutional law; state
judicial practice, a different body of U.S. constitutional law; citizen practice, perhaps, yet another;
noncitizen practice, perhaps, yet another.
Id. at 747–48.
154 JOSEPH RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF LEGAL
SYSTEM 192 (2d ed. 1980).

607

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Even a theory that embraces multiple rules of recognition and
recognitional communities, however, cannot fully prevent uncertainty.
While some rules of recognition are more settled than others, other rules and
recognitional communities may still create uncertainty and contention over
what constitutes law. If we accept that the Joint Chiefs are their own
recognitional community for “laws” regarding the military, they do not
accept or reject a law on behalf of themselves only; they decide for the
country as a whole. Had the Joint Chiefs accepted Trump’s tweet as law by
beginning to implement it, dissenting voices, perhaps even protests, would
have sprung into action. It is apparent how this could lead to conflict. In fact,
with multiple rules of recognition, the varying recognitional communities
can disagree about what is “law,” which will consequently manifest as
disputes and uncertainty.
The discussion above illuminates the ongoing debates over many
executive actions. These debates support the assertion that second-order
uncertainty—uncertainty about who has the authority to settle first-order
uncertainty—is prevalent in our legal system.155 Professor Scott J. Shapiro
has theorized that the main source of second-order uncertainty within a legal
system is political morality; because “many people disagree about the
natures of justice, equality, liberty, privacy, security and the like, they are
bound to disagree about the proper form that government ought to take.”156
No doubt this disagreement contributes to uncertainty regarding the
Executive Branch because it reflects divided beliefs about separation of
powers, legitimate authority, and liberty—all of which invoke differing
conceptions of political morality.
Even within the Executive Branch, across administrations, there is
debate about agencies’ legitimate authority to unilaterally promulgate new
policies. For example, in 2019, the Office of Management and Budget sent
a memorandum reminding all agencies to comply with the Congressional
Review Act, the law governing Congress’s ability to overturn rules passed
by agencies.157 The first two sentences of the memo stated, “The Constitution
vests all Federal legislative power in Congress. In our system of separation
of powers, agencies may prescribe rules only insofar as they have statutory
authority delegated to them by Congress.”158 Here we have a prime example
of second-order uncertainty. This memorandum shows uncertainty in the
155

Shapiro, supra note 24, at 16.
Id.
157 Memorandum from Russell T. Vought, Acting Dir., Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, to Heads of Exec.
Dep’ts & Agencies 1 (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/M-1914.pdf [https://perma.cc/MQ73-MN79].
158 Id.
156
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Executive Branch because it was meant to respond to what was perceived as
an abuse of agency power in the previous administration, demonstrating that
not even the Executive Branch can decide whether certain executive actions
are laws or not from administration to administration. Thus, there is reason
to question whether the rule of recognition is serving its function as an
uncertainty-settling device.
Still, Hart might insist that the rule of recognition works to settle
uncertainty through observing official behavior. But how are officials
determining which laws they must follow in the first place? Unless the rule
of recognition is resolving uncertainty for them, these officials are free to
decide what to follow and what not to follow. And without a command
rooted in positive law about what to follow, officials may tether themselves
to normative reasoning and use moral justifications to decide for themselves.
Put differently, without a referent to certain positive law, government
officials are forced to consider external or personal justifications when
deciding whether to recognize potential sources of law.
If so, then the rule of recognition’s failure to resolve uncertainty calls
into question the overall thesis of legal positivism, which claims that
assessments of what constitutes law must necessarily remain separate from
assessments of morality.159 Professor Ronald Dworkin made the argument
that when judges apply law to new circumstances, judges are doing more
than saying what the law is; they are in fact making policy, and taking into
account value judgments. 160 Hart offers a response to this critique in his
article Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals.161 Hart asserts that
although it may appear that extending the law to new circumstances
necessarily requires considering morality, actually two separate
conversations are taking place. 162 The first is concerned with the law’s
validity; i.e., is this a law under our system? The second is concerned with
the law’s normativity; i.e., should this be a law? The first discussion remains

159

See supra note 8. Though different versions of legal positivism diverge in some areas, they are
all unified in accepting the “separation thesis,” which insists that law and morality are distinct. See Robin
West, Three Positivisms, 78 B.U. L. REV. 791, 792 (1998). Because law does not owe its existence to
morality, there must be some way in any legal positivist system to identify what is law. This is where
Hart’s rule of recognition plays a crucial role.
160 Though Dworkin limited this resort to moral thinking to judges, it could also be true of executive
officials. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 255–56 (1986) (“Hard cases arise, for any judge, when
his threshold test does not discriminate between two or more interpretations of some statute or line of
cases. Then he must choose between eligible interpretations by asking which shows the community’s
structure of institutions and decisions—its public standards as a whole—in a better light from the
standpoint of political morality.”).
161 See Hart, supra note 138.
162 Id. at 627.
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separate from morality, and therefore, according to Hart, legal positivism’s
separation thesis holds.163
But the examples of uncertainty from the Executive Branch give us
reason to suspect that even determining a law’s validity involves normative
considerations. If it is unclear whether the Constitution or statute allows
novel uses of executive power, uncertainty ensues, and officials must ask
“What do I do? Is this lawful?” In answering this question, because positive
law is helplessly ambiguous or stubbornly silent on the issue, the officials
might consider their own conceptions of what is valid, allowing normative
considerations to creep into accepting or rejecting the regulation.164
For example, what did the Joint Chiefs consider when deciding that
Trump’s tweet did not qualify as valid policy? There is no law directly
preventing a President from announcing policy changes through social
media. Hart’s defenders might say they referred to existing laws detailing
how the President can issue new policies. But the above examples show that
the Executive Branch often acts in a zone of twilight—neither expressly
prohibited from acting nor expressly permitted to act. More likely, the Joint
Chiefs resorted to their normative conceptions of what counts as “law.” An
official’s own intuitions of right and wrong will be the North Star when the
rest of the world is dark. This is exactly what legal positivists hope to avoid.
Once the official acts, Hart would observe her behavior and say that her
actions have legitimated the law under the rule of recognition. Yet that
process of legitimation might be inextricable from a moral decision.165
To present an even more dramatic example, if Executive Branch
lawyers pushed to continue supporting unlawful actions, some have argued
that “[i]n addition to being prepared to say no . . . officials must also be
prepared to resign in the extraordinary event the President persists in acting
unlawfully or demands that OLC legitimize unlawful activity.” 166 Here,
resistance to “unlawful” executive action would necessarily entail
considering the morally right thing to do. This is especially true if we are
asking executive officials to resign rather than implement or execute

163

See id. at 628–29.
See Ristroph, supra note 38, at 451 (arguing that government officials “follow their own rules of
recognition in good faith” when trying to determine what is law, but this “does not satisfy Hart’s account
of law”).
165 My use of the term “moral” here is intentionally capacious. It is meant to capture decision-making
based on the official’s policy or economic judgments, such as which policy is better for the agency or
which is more efficient, for these would not be decisions based on positive law but would instead be based
on the individual’s judgment.
166 Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Legal Constraints on Executive Power,
54 UCLA L. REV. 1559, 1601 (2007).
164
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“wrong” actions. Such a conclusion—that I would rather quit my job than
carry out an order—must stand on moral grounds.
Hart’s separation thesis presupposes that amoral factors can sufficiently
guide individuals in interpreting and implementing old laws in new
situations. But as the above examples show, these amoral factors are so
undefined in the context of executive actions that in these situations officials
must resort to morality to determine what is law. Because the rule of
recognition cannot resolve the conflict and uncertainty we see in the
Executive Branch, the debate over validity becomes a debate about morality.
This observation, in turn, casts doubt on the separation thesis.
CONCLUSION
In applying Hart’s rule of recognition to current legal realities, this Note
sheds light on some flaws inherent in the theory. If Hart’s rule of recognition
serves its purpose, it should settle uncertainty and be able to tell us which
executive actions have the authority of law. Yet when we try to make sense
of various executive actions, the rule of recognition falls short. These pitfalls
raise important questions about our government and Hart’s theory. Perhaps
there is something wrong with the actions of our Executive Branch or with
Hart’s theory. Maybe the rule of recognition is failing to settle uncertainty as
it is proffered to do. Or maybe it gives us reason to question legal
positivism’s separation thesis. This Note uses examples from the Executive
Branch to analyze these questions without offering conclusive answers, for
this is intended to be part of—and by no means end—an ongoing
conversation as we try to reconcile philosophical theories with legal practice.
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